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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes three measures to quantify the characteristics
of online signature templates in terms of distinctiveness, complexity
and repeatability. A distinctiveness measure of a signature template
is computed from a set of enrolled signature samples and a statis-
tical assumption about random signatures. Secondly, a complexity
measure of the template is derived from a set of enrolled signature
samples. Finally, given a signature template, a measure to quantify
the repeatability of the online signature is derived from a validation
set of samples. These three measures can then be used as an indica-
tor for the performance of the system in rejecting random forgery
samples and skilled forgery samples and the performance of users in
providing accepted genuine samples, respectively. The effectiveness
of these three measures and their applications are demonstrated
through experiments performed on three online signature datasets
and one keystroke dynamics dataset using different verification al-
gorithms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For the past decade or so, research in biometric verification systems
has mostly focused on effective feature sets and recognition algo-
rithms to improve verification performance [24, 30, 4, 36, 37, 22,
21, 35]. However, several studies have indicated that characteristics
of biometric samples used in the enrollment process to create a veri-
fication template can also play a crucial role in the overall accuracy
and reliability of biometric systems [1, 40, 34]. Specifically, the
accuracy of face, fingerprint, and iris biometric systems evaluated
on good quality biometric samples is much higher than systems
evaluated on poor quality samples [14]. In text password based
authentication where users are allowed to choose a password freely,
it is known that some users would choose a weak password or a
password that could be guessed easily [17]. This problem has led
to many studies related to assessing password strength and also the
development of mechanisms such as the password strength meter
∗Published as [32]
that offers feedback and enforces a policy to reject a weak password
during the enrollment stage itself [17].
Similarly, there is a need for the assessment of biometric template
characteristics when enrollment is done without supervision [18],
e.g., for mobile device authentication, and rejecting samples that
could lead to degradation of performance. This is especially true
for behavioral biometric based authentication techniques such as
online signatures or key stroke dynamics. In behavioral biometric
verification systems it is difficult to collect a set of negative samples
that could accurately represent a population. Therefore, a user
specific template is generally modeled based purely on a small
number of enrolled samples, without using imposter samples. Hence,
at a given threshold, the verification performance can be profoundly
different from one template to another.
For example, in online signature authentication, a user may enroll
a template that is very simple. As a result, attackers could easily
produce a signature that matches the template, resulting in a compro-
mised account. In this context, an assessment of biometric template
characteristics could be used to design proper mechanisms to cope
with such weak templates [2, 13, 28, 39]. For example, given a
template that is predicted to yield high FAR (False Acceptance Rate:
the likelihood that forgery samples will be incorrectly accepted by
the system) but low FRR (False Rejection Rate: the likelihood that
genuine samples will be incorrectly rejected by the system), the
system could examine whether a few bad enrolled samples could be
safely removed to lower FAR without degrading FRR. Or given a
template that is predicted to yield high FRR, the system may prompt
users to re-enroll or practice more with their signatures.
In this paper we focus on characteristics of one particular type
of behavioral biometrics, namely online signatures. We develop
three simple assessment characteristics of online signature templates
and investigate their ability to predict FAR and FRR. The three
characteristics are: 1) Distinctiveness refers to how much this user’s
signature differs from others, which indicates the probability of a
user being impersonated by a random signature, 2) Complexity
refers to how hard to forge this user’s signature. This indicates
the probability of a user being impersonated by a forged signature,
and 3) Repeatability refers to how likely this user can repeat her
signature which indicates the probability of a genuine sample being
rejected by the system.
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(a) Random forgery (b) Skilled forgery
Figure 1: FAR against random forgery and skilled forgery for each user in MCYT dataset when a user’s signature template is derived from the first 10 genuine
samples and threshold set at EER with respect to the algorithm described in [30]
(a) The 25th percentile user
(b) The 75th percentile user
Figure 2: The 3rd, 7th, and 10th samples of two users from MCYT dataset
with mean imposter scores at the 25th and 75th percentile
We show, using experiments, how the assessment of these charac-
teristics for online signature templates can be used to infer security
and usability of a particular online signature template. Specifically,
distinctiveness and complexity could be indicative of security or
FAR of the signature template against random forgeries and skilled
forgeries respectively. Also, repeatability could be indicative of
usability in terms of FRR, which refers to the ability of the user
in gaining access to the system using her signature. Note that this
work is an extension of previous work [31] where we presented the
metric to measure distinctiveness of online signature templates and
preliminary results to demonstrate its efficacy.
1.1 Performance disparity of signature tem-
plates
To illustrate the disparity in characteristics of online signature tem-
plates in terms of distinctiveness and complexity, FAR against ran-
dom forgery and skilled forgery of each individual in MCYT dataset
is plotted in Figure 1. Note that EER denotes the equal error rate
or the rate at which FAR and FRR are equal. Samples of enrolled
signatures that lead to the mean imposter score at the 25th and 75th
percentile are shown in Figure 2. It is noticed that, in addition to
the intrinsic difference of the two signatures, the first set of signa-
tures (25th percentile) shows significant variation among enrolled
samples. Consequently, the mean of the imposter score distribution
(a) Simple signature (b) Complex signature
Figure 3: The samples of simple and complex signatures from MCYT dataset
of the first set is lower than the second. Note that the score here
represents dissimilarity between a test sample and the signature
template. A lower score means more similar to the template.
Similarly, the samples of signature that are considered simple and
complex (the ones with higher and lower FAR respectively) are
illustrated in Figure 3. That is, the more complex signature templates
are the ones with the higher amount of directional and speed changes
between two consecutive drawing vectors and also with consistent
enrolled signature samples.
In addition to FAR, it is also known that in a biometric verification
system, user contribution toward FRR is disproportional [27]. This
can also be observed in online signatures as illustrated in Figure 4.
Repeatability of a biometric trait, i.e., similarity between enrolled
signatures and genuine test samples with respect to a given recog-
nition system, is different from user to user, as demonstrated in
Figure 5. That is, the templates constructed from enrolled samples
that do not sufficiently capture variation among genuine samples
would exhibit higher FRR. This in turn affects usability. In fact,
repeatability of biometric features has been studied in many bio-
metric modalities including ocular biometric [6], brain EEG [29],
and online signatures [9]. These studies focused on evaluating re-
peatability of biometric features using samples across sessions in
order to derive an optimal feature set to be used in the recognition
system. However, they do not help in inferring user or template
specific FRR.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work on
biometric characteristics or quality is discussed in Section 2. Next,
the proposed method to assess three online signature template char-
acteristics is described in Section 3. In Section 4, experimental
results that demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed metrics
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Figure 4: Genuine score distribution of different users from NYU dataset
with respected to the algorithm described in [30]
are presented. Conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2. RELATEDWORK
The phenomenon of a “biometric menagerie”, or “biometric zoo”,
has been observed in many biometric modalities and across several
datasets [40, 11]. These terms refer to the observation that the contri-
bution of each user towards the overall FAR and FRR of a biometric
system can vary significantly. For example, lambs are users who
have high match scores with random imposters thereby having a
higher FAR. As a result of this observation, studies on the quality
of biometric samples emerged in order to improve system perfor-
mance and reliability. For instance, based on a quality measure, one
could decide whether to: 1) alter the enrollment process including
requesting users to re-enroll in the system, 2) adjust the decision
threshold [39] or weighting function in a multimodal biometric sys-
tem, 3) invoke different preprocessing or recognition algorithms [2],
or 4) update the template [8]. A quality score could also be used
as a deciding factor whether an additional biometric trait has to be
required [28].
Automated quality measurement of biometric samples has been
explored in many modalities, e.g., fingerprint, iris, and speaker
recognition. One typical approach is to measure the quality of the
signal extracted from a biometric sensor. For example, in face and
ear biometric, the sparse coding error which can detect expression,
pose and random pixel corruption has been proposed as a quality
metric [13]. In speaker verification, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
and the perceived quality of speech utterance have been used [38].
This approach is applicable to physiological biometrics where signal
quality of a biometric sample plays an important role in recognition
performance for a particular user.
However, the general concept of behavioral biometric recognition
system is quite different from that of a physiological one. In a be-
havioral biometric system, a user’s biometric sample is collected
over a period of time and the user’s template or a description of a
user-specific classifier is typically derived from characteristics of
the enrolled samples as well as their intra-user variation. Further-
more, for some types of behavior biometrics, there is user choice in
creating the template. For example with online signatures, a user
can select from multiple signatures. Therefore, the characteristics
of the behavioral biometric templates which infer recognition per-
formance of the system for a particular user, depends on multiple
factors including the character or essence of an individual biometric
trait, the distinctiveness of the underlying content of the template,
(a) The first session samples
(b) The second session samples
Figure 5: The 4th and 8th samples of a user with high FRR from SUSIG
dataset showing that the samples in the first session are consistent but they
are not consistent with the ones from the second session
the consistency between the samples used for enrollment and the
repeatability between the enrolled samples and test samples [3].
One approach that is more suitable for behavioral biometrics is to
quantify the amount of biometric information embedded in biomet-
ric samples. For example, Kullback-Leibler divergence between a
feature vector of a query sample and the average feature vector from
all enrollment samples has been proposed as the quality metric in
keystroke dynamic [20]. Regarding handwritten signature modali-
ties, Zois et al., [41] has proposed overall quality characterization
of genuine signatures by means of stability and complexity derived
from distribution statistics and stroke characteristics. For the specific
case of online signature systems, a research attempt to develop a
quality metric for a set of enrolled samples based on local density es-
timation by a hidden markov model has been made [10]. In addition,
a quality metric for online signatures based on a sigma-lognormal
model which measures kinematic information exhibited in online
signature samples has been developed [7]. These studies, along with
the one in [12], have demonstrated that, enrolled signatures with
different quality ranges result in different verification performance.
However, it is not clear that the observed performance discrepancy is
caused by the difference in genuine or imposter score distributions.
In other words, the type of a user in the biometric menagerie can not
be identified using these quality metrics. As a result, it is difficult to
refine selection strategies to deal with problematic templates [25]
thereby limiting the value of the quality metric. In addition, the
concept of a user’s personal entropy and relative entropy to infer
a signature template’s FRR and FAR against skilled forgery has
recently been introduced by Houmani et al., in 2016 [11]. In their
work, the proposed user’s relative entropy for each signature tem-
plate is derived from Kullback-Leibler distance between the local
probability density functions of HMM model of genuine samples
and that of skilled forgeries. The drawback of this approach is the
need for skilled forgery samples, which are not generally available.
In contrast to the above, this paper focuses on assessing three charac-
teristics relevant to the quality of online signature templates, namely
distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability scores using only gen-
uine samples. These metrics can then be used as an indicator for
imposter score distributions of random forgeries and skilled forgery
as well as genuine score distributions, separately. The characteristics
proposed in this paper have multiple benefits. First, the distinctive-
ness and complexity of an online signature template is directly
related to the likelihood of a user being a lamb, i.e., a user who
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is vulnerable to impersonation [40]. The distinctiveness and com-
plexity metric can be used to detect such users and depending on
the application, require them to enroll with a new signature or to
provide more samples of the signature to substitute inconsistent
ones. In addition, the repeatability metric can be used to detect
goat users, i.e. the users with signatures that have low repeatability
thereby resulting in high false rejection rates [40, 26]. In this case,
more training sessions might be required for a user’s signature to
stabilize. These mechanisms could be particularly useful when the
biometric system operates without supervision as in the case of user
authentication on mobile devices.
3. PROPOSEDONLINE SIGNATURETEM-
PLATE CHARACTERISTICS
In this section, the metrics to assess distinctiveness, complexity, and
repeatability of online signature templates are presented. Specif-
ically, distinctiveness and complexity are computed based on a
subset of histogram features from a recently proposed histogram-
based verification system [30]. That is, given an online signature
instance represented by a time-series of data points where the at-
tributes of each data point include x-y coordinates, pressure, etc.,
the histograms for this signature sample are then computed from
time-series of the attributes and their derivatives [30]. Repeatabil-
ity is computed based on genuine scores of enrolled samples and
validation samples.
3.1 Template distinctiveness
Since many verification algorithms do not assume existence of
forgery samples, online signature verification algorithms typically
normalize sample attributes, e.g., similarity/dissimilarity score, fea-
tures, etc., by the distribution of training samples [15, 30, 19]. Con-
sequently, when a system is operated at the same decision threshold
level for all users, signatures with different characteristics will cor-
respond to different levels of FAR. In other words, some users
would have less protection against random forgery than others. This
subsection describes a method to derive a signature template distinc-
tiveness score that can be indicative of such problematic templates.
The proposed method is based on statistical discrimination of fea-
tures derived from a set of genuine online signatures and a generic
assumption about random signatures. Specifically, the features used
here are histograms of speed-angle and pressure derived from the
first and second halves of an online signature.
The first step is to compute statistics of feature distributions of user
signature samples and random signature samples. The statistics
of feature distributions of user signature samples can be derived
directly from the set of enrolled signature samples. However, it is not
a trivial task to collect a set of random forgery samples. In addition,
statistics derived from actual signatures in a dataset could depend
on the signing language, acquisition device etc., and could vary
across datasets. Therefore, in order to compute statistics of random
forgery samples, a general assumption about random signatures is
made specifically about the features used to compute this metric
rather than using a set of random signatures. This is in fact a
great benefit of deriving statistics in feature spaces instead of using
score distribution where a collection of random signature samples is
required. Then the second step is to compute a decidability index [5],
which is a measure of separation between feature distribution of
user signature samples and random signature samples, for each of
the features. Lastly, the distinctiveness score is computed from a
sum of each feature decidability index.
Let (µTfi ,σ
T
fi ) and (µ
P
fi ,σ
P
fi ) be the mean and standard deviation of
the ith feature distributions fi of user-signature samples and random
signature samples. The decidability index for the ith feature, denoted
by d fi , for these two distributions is defined as follows:
d fi =
‖µTfi −µPfi‖√
(σTfi +σ
P
fi )/2
(1)
For µTfi and σ
T
fi , they can be derived from the feature distribution of
the user’s enrolled samples in the template.
Then, the problem of deriving feature distribution statistics (µPfi ,σ
P
fi )
of random forgery samples is addressed by using global statistics,
instead of dataset specific ones. That is, since the feature set that
is used to compute the distinctiveness score of signature templates
comprises of frequency of histogram bins from speed-angle and
pressure histograms, the statistics of the distribution of each his-
togram bin frequency can be estimated using a generic assumption
about random signatures as follows.
Let R = {ri|i = 1,2, ...,L} be the time series of a particular attribute
from a random signature of length L that is used to derive a particular
histogram. Let also assume that the probability of ri falling into any
histogram bin be uniform and independent. That is, the probability
that ri falls into any bin of histogram equals to 1N where N is the total
number of bins that appear in the given histogram. Consequently,
the probability distribution of the number of elements ri falling
into a particular bin follows a binomial distribution. That is, the
probability that a histogram bin has a value k is given by:
P(k) =
(
L
k
)
pk(1− p)L−k (2)
where P(k) is the probability that k elements (from the total of L
elements) fall into a particular bin of the histogram and p = 1N is the
probability that ri falls into a particular bin of an N-bin histogram.
As a result, the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ ) of each his-
togram bin value according to the distribution in (2) can be derived
as:
µPfi = L× p = L×
1
N
, (3)
and σPfi =
√
L× p× (1− p) =
√
L× (N−1)
N2
(4)
The above gives the statistics of the histogram feature distribution
of random signatures when a histogram is attributed by the actual
count of elements falling into a particular histogram bin. And for
a relative frequency histogram, the mean and standard deviation of
the histogram feature is further divided by L. That is:
µPfi =
1
N
, (5)
and σPfi =
√
1
L
× (N−1)
N2
(6)
Then, the overall distinctiveness D(T ) of the template T is defined
by:
D(T ) =
M
∑
=1
dTfi (7)
where M is the total number of features used to compute the distinc-
tiveness score. Note that the histogram features used here are the
ones from speed-angle and pressure histograms derived from the
first and second halves of an online signature.
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This template distinctiveness score D(T ) takes both the uniqueness
and consistency of enrolled signature samples in the template under
consideration. In particular, the difference of feature mean values
between random forgery samples and enrolled signature samples
of a user could be viewed as uniqueness of that user’s signature.
Similarly, feature variance values derived from the enrolled samples
of each user could be viewed as the inverse of consistency of the
user’s enrolled signature samples.
3.2 Template complexity
The complexity score of an online signature template is a security
measure against skilled forgery attempts. That is, the more complex
signature templates are the ones that are harder to forge.The pro-
posed signature complexity score is computed using the histogram
features based on two factors: the degree of signature complexity
and the dispersion index function of a signature.
3.2.1 Degree of signature complexity:
Intuitively, the simplest form of a signature is to continuously draw
in the same manner, i.e., one where a signature has no change in
the drawing angle or speed. Given a histogram of speed and angle
of drawing vectors derived from an online signature, the speed and
angle histogram of the simplest signature is one where all elements
fall in the same bin. Therefore, the signature complexity can be
defined in terms of the change magnitude and frequency in the angle
and speed of drawing vectors. That is, we first define the basic
drawing vector of the signature as the vector that appears the most in
the signature, i.e., the histogram bin that has the highest count. Then
the signature complexity is defined as the minimum earth moving
distance [33] required to convert the histogram of signature to the
histogram of simplest signature as discussed above. That is:
EMD(T ) =
M
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
hT (i, j)×w(i, j) (8)
where hT (i, j) is the minimum value of histogram frequency in the
(i, j)th histogram bin among the enrolled signatures. The weight for
each speed-angle histogram bin w(i, j) is computed as the Euclidean
distance from that speed-angle histogram bin to the speed-angle
histogram bin of the basic drawing vector. That is, let the bin of
basic drawing vector of the histogram be (ire f , jre f ), the distance
between this bin and (i, j) bin is defined as:
w(i, j) =
√
(ire f − i)2
M
+
( jre f − j)2
N
(9)
where the size of speed-angle histogram is M by N.
3.2.2 Inverse of signature template dispersion:
Naturally, it would require higher skill to forge a consistent signature
without being detected. In other words, the more consistent signature
is the one that is harder to forge. Therefore, dispersion of a signature
or signature histogram features could be used as another factor
to infer complexity of the online signature. Here the inverse of
signature template dispersion InvD(T ) is defined as an average of
inverse of index of dispersion of all features:
InvD(T ) =
1
K
K
∑
i=1
id−1fi (10)
where the index of dispersion of each histogram features, id fi , is
formulated as the ratio of the variance to the mean of the ith feature
to quantify whether a set of observed occurrences are clustered or
dispersed compared to a standard statistical model. That is:
id fi =
σ2fi
µ fi
(11)
And K is the total number of histogram features fi used to compute
dispersion index that result in a definite number (removing all the
features with zero mean).
Then, the complexity C(T ) of an online signature template T can
be derived using these two functions:
C(T ) = EMD(T )× InvD(T ) (12)
Note that since the simplest form of signature is defined as the
signature that has no change in the drawing angle or speed, the
histogram features used to compute energy of signature template
and inverse of dispersion of signature templates are the ones from
speed-angle derived from the first and second halves of an online
signature.
3.3 Template repeatability
In general, the system should always grant access to legitimate users
who present genuine credentials. However, in an online signature
verification system, repeatability or the ability of users in repeating
their own signatures can vary. As a result, genuine attempts of
some users are rejected more often than others. Specifically, given a
signature template, this paper proposed signature repeatability score
that could be used to infer FRR of that template and it could be
derived from a validation set of online signature samples that are
collected in different sessions than the enrollment session.
Let S(gi|T ) be the dissimilarity score of the genuine sample gi
(computed from a recognition algorithm) derived from the template
T. The inverse of repeatability score is computed from the average
of the dissimilarity scores of all genuine samples in a validation set.
Here, dissimilarity score could be computed from any recognition
algorithm and it is the inverse of similarity score. (More details on
the recognition algorithms used in this paper are provided in the
next section.) That is, the inverse of repeatability score R−1(T ) is
given by:
R−1(T ) = ∑
n
i=1 S(gi|T )
n
(13)
Or repeatability score R(T ) is:
R(T ) =
n
∑ni=1 S(gi|T )
(14)
where G = {gi|i = 1,2, ...,n} is the validation set of n genuine
samples.
Here, the template with higher repeatability score is the one that cor-
responds to the user whose dissimilarity scores of genuine samples
from a validation set are lower. In other words, it corresponds to a
user whose genuine samples are more consistent across the sessions.
As a result, for a given template, a higher repeatability score infers
lower FRR.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, experiments performed to evaluate the efficacy of
the proposed distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability metrics
are described and results are reported.
4.1 Dataset
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In this study, online signature experiments were performed using
two public datasets: MCYT [23] and SUSIG [15], as well as NYU
dataset [30]. Specifically, MCYT consists of 100 user’s signatures
with 25 samples per user. SUSIG consists of 94 user’s signatures, 20
samples per user. NYU consists of 178 user’s signatures, 30 samples
per user over 6 separate sessions (5 samples each session). Unlike
the first two dataset, signatures from NYU were collected in an
uncontrolled and unsupervised manner using the user’s iOS device
via HTML5. In addition, CMU keystroke dynamics dataset [16]
was also used to evaluate effectiveness of the repeatability metric.
In this dataset, 400 genuine samples per user were collected from 8
sessions (50 samples per session).
4.2 Performance of the distinctiveness measure
4.2.1 Experimental protocol and verification algorithm
The experiments were performed on MCYT, SUSIG and NYU
datasets. The template of each signature was constructed using
five genuine samples chosen at random from all genuine samples.
This random process was repeated 100 times in MCYT dataset and
SUSIG dataset, and 10 times in NYU dataset in order to get variants
of templates from the same signature.
Two function-based and one feature-based algorithms were used.
The two function-based algorithms are DTW and HMM approach
and the feature based algorithm is the histogram approach [30]. For
DTW approach, we have implemented the algorithm using 4 se-
quences which are x-y coordinates of an online signature and their
first derivatives. For the x-y coordinate, the sequence is translated
such that the first coordinate is at the origin. Then the pairwise
distance between two signature is computed from the DTW distance
normalized by the minimum length between the two signatures.
Lastly, the dissimilarity score was the ratio between the average of
all pairwise distance between enrolled signatures and a test signa-
ture and the average of all pairwise distance between two enrolled
signatures. For HMM approach, we have used the score result from
the Biosecure reference system1. Note that, for HMM approach,
only the scores of signatures from MCYT dataset were available for
download. Therefore, we report the performance of the proposed
distinctiveness score on HMM approach for only MCYT dataset.
For the implementation of histogram approach, we have used the
code provided by the authors2. The random forgery verification
performance of these algorithms using the protocol described above
was as follows. EERs for DTW on MCYT, SUSIG, and NYU,
were 2.19%, 3.11%, and 5.78%, respectively. Similarly, EERs
for histogram-based were 0.72%, 1.95%, and 4.11%, respectively.
EERs for HMM on MCYT was 0.95%.
At the same decision threshold for similarity score, FAR is expected
to increase as distinctiveness score decreases. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed template distinctiveness, the distinc-
tiveness scores for all signature templates are first computed. Then,
all the scores were sorted and the templates were divided into four
groups according to their distinctiveness. For each group, the aver-
age FAR of all the users in the group at different decision threshold
were computed where negative samples were drawn from a random
sample of all other users. As such, the group of templates with lower
1More information about this system is available at http://svnext.
it-sudparis.eu/svnview2-eph/ref_syst//.
2Matlab code of this algorithm is available for download
at http://isis.poly.edu/~benapa/OnlineSignature/signature_
index.html.
distinctiveness score is expected to have higher average FAR across
the threshold range.
4.2.2 Experimental results
To derive the distinctiveness for each template, a signature length
of 147 (the average length of signatures from MCYT and SUSIG
datasets) was used to derive statistics of the population. Also,
when computing the distinctiveness for a signature template in both
MCYT and SUSIG, the histograms of speed-angle and pressure for
the first and second halves of the signature were used since these
are derived from all three attributes (x-y coordinates and pressure
information) captured from a signature sample. Note that since
pressure information was not available for NYU dataset, only the
histograms of speed-angle for the first and second halves of the
signature were used. The mean (and standard deviation) of the
distinctiveness scores for templates in MCYT, SUSIG, and NYU
datasets were 187.28 (23.24), 171.83 (17.73), and 108.50 (13.92),
respectively. The signature samples that resulted in the high and low
distinctiveness and their feature box-plot are illustrated in Figure 6.
While the two signatures are somewhat similar in terms of unique-
ness, samples of the template with the higher distinctiveness are
more consistent than those of the other. Also, the feature box-plot
shows that the signature template with the lower distinctiveness is
the one with higher number of speed-angle histogram features with
non-zeroes variance.
In Figure 7, the dependency between FAR and template distinctive-
ness scores is demonstrated through trade-off curves between FAR
and threshold. For MCYT and SUSIG, it is noticed that, at the same
threshold level, the group with the higher distinctiveness score gen-
erally achieved better FAR. However, the decision threshold level
that correspond to the same FAR was different in these two datasets.
One possible explanation is that, in SUSIG dataset, the users did
not use their real signatures, but instead were asked to create new
signatures specifically for experimental purpose [15]. Consequently,
signatures in this dataset were expected to exhibit a higher level
of variation. As a result, a lower FAR was achieved at the same
threshold, as compared to MCYT.
Similarly, in NYU dataset, the group of template with lower dis-
tinctiveness score consistently corresponds to higher average FAR
across the threshold range. This result confirms the efficacy of the
proposed distinctiveness metric regardless of dataset characteris-
tics and the algorithms used. However, it should be note that the
range of threshold and distinctiveness scores of signature templates
are not directly comparable with that of those two datasets due to
unavailability of pressure information in this NYU dataset.
Lastly, we acknowledge that, since negative samples were drawn
from samples of all other users in the same dataset, the trade-off
curve between FAR and the threshold for each individual user was
dataset dependent. Correspondingly, this rate could possibly change
drastically when the same set of enrolled samples is tested against a
different dataset.
4.2.3 Effectiveness of the random signature assump-
tion
In the previous subsection, distinctiveness was derived from the
generic assumption made about random signatures as described
in Section 3.1. Alternately, distinctiveness could also be derived
using the statistics of actual signatures (means and variances of
histogram features that are used to compute distinctiveness scores).
This subsection will demonstrate the effectiveness of the generic
assumption made about random signatures that resulted in accurate
distinctiveness scores as compared to those derived from actual sig-
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(a) Samples of the 159 distinctiveness (b) Samples of the 197 distinctiveness
(c) Speed-angle of the template in a) (d) Speed-angle of the template in b)
Figure 6: Samples and sorted speed-angle histogram feature box-plot (by mean value) of signatures from SUSIG dataset that their templates correspond to the
low and high distinctiveness
natures. First, we begin by introducing Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient as a performance assessment of biometric quality metrics.
Then, this coefficient will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
statistics derived from random signature assumption as compared
to ones derived from other datasets. Specifically, Spearman’s rank
coefficient is a (non-parametric) measure of statistical dependence,
or strength of monotonic functional relationship, between ranks of
two variables. That is:
ρ = 1− 6×∑
n
i d
2
i
n× (n2−1) (15)
where di =rank(xi)−rank(yi), rank(xi) and rank(yi) are the ranks of
two variables xi and yi of the ith observation, and n is the total num-
ber of observations. Hence, using this Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between the rank of prediction of a template’s verifica-
tion performance (or the rank of template’s distinctiveness scores),
and the rank of actual verification performance of templates (or a
golden rank), the effectiveness of quality metrics can be assessed
more objectively and they can be compared more easily.
One remaining task is to compute the golden rank, or ground truth
of each biometric template, to be used for comparison. Since this
metric will be used to evaluate distinctiveness of the template which
is indicative of FAR for random forgery, this problem is addressed
by computing the golden rank from the rank of an average (mean)
imposter score for that user. Specifically, imposter scores are com-
puted from random signatures drawn from all signatures of all other
users within the same dataset. As a result, the higher the Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficient of a quality metric means the
better alignment of the rank of the quality scores with the average
imposter scores of users, and, generally, the better predictive of FAR
for random forgeries. Note that, the golden rank could be adjusted
to match a more specific FAR range.
The results of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient when the
statistics are derived from the generic assumption about random
signatures as well as signatures from different datasets are presented
in Table 1. Specifically, in this experiment, distinctiveness scores
of online signature templates are derived from histogram feature
statistics of each dataset in addition to the statistics derived from the
generic assumption about random signatures. Then, the Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient between the golden rank and the rank of
distinctiveness scores derived from different statistics are computed.
According to the result, the highest correlation coefficients are ob-
served when the statistics are derived from the test dataset, except
one case when DTW algorithm is applied on MCYT. For example,
when computing the distinctiveness score for signature templates
of MCYT dataset, the most effective statistics are the ones derived
from MCYT dataset. This is not surprising as the golden rank is
derived from the mean imposter scores of each template where those
imposter samples are also drawn from all other signatures in the
dataset.
However, in most cases, the correlation coefficient decreases greatly
when statistics are derived from signatures of different datasets and
these coefficients are often lower than the one when statistics are
derived from generic assumption about random signatures. This
confirms that the generic assumption can effectively be used to
derive distinctiveness of a signature collection in different settings.
As a result, the proposed distinctiveness metric can be computed
without the need of a training set and, more importantly, without
loss of generality.
4.3 Performance of the complexity measure
4.3.1 Experimental protocol and Verification algorithm
For complexity, experiments were performed on MCYT and SUSIG
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Figure 7: Trade-off curves between FAR of random forgery of three algorithms on MCYT, SUSIG, and NYU dataset versus threshold for each user group
separated by the proposed distinctiveness
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Table 1: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between different statistics
and distinctiveness scores of user’s signature templates
The source of DTW Histogram
feature statistics Test dataset Test dataset
MCYT SUSIG NYU MCYT SUSIG NYU
MCYT 0.27 0.06 0.082 0.78 0.37 0.33
SUSIG 0.15 0.32 0.3 0.47 0.68 0.59
NYU n.a. n.a. 0.28 n.a. n.a. 0.71
Generic assumption 0.34 0.19 0.17 0.50 0.57 0.56
datasets since these skilled forgery samples or imitation samples
are available. The random process to select 5 enrolled samples
were repeated for 100 times in MCYT and SUSIG dataset, and 10
times in NYU dataset. Since this experiment was performed on
the same two datasets as the pervious one, we have used the same
three verification algorithms to evaluate the effectiveness of this
metric. The skilled forgery verification performance of these three
algorithms using the protocol described above was as follows. EERs
of DTW on MCYT and SUSIG were 8.28% and 8.05, respectively.
EERs of histogram-based on MCYT and SUSIG were 2.89% and
3.93%, respectively. EERs of HMM on MCYT was 3.41%.
4.3.2 Experimental results
The mean (and standard deviation) of complexity scores for tem-
plates in MCYT and SUSIG datasets were 175.11 (753.11) and
145.32 (866.23), respectively. Trade-off curves between FAR against
skilled forgery for HMM, DTW, and histogram feature algorithms
on MCYT and SUSIG datasets when signature templates are di-
vided into four groups according to their complexity scores are
presented in Figure 8. It is noticed that, at the same threshold level,
the signature group with the higher complexity score could achieve
better FAR against skilled forgery. This result is consistent on both
datasets and across all three verification algorithms.
4.3.3 Effectiveness of complexity measure
In this subsection, the performance of the complexity measure in in-
dicating the FAR of skilled forgeries is also analyzed in terms of the
Spearman Rank correlation. That is, the Spearman Rank correlation
between three different statistics of imposter dissimilarity scores
and the template complexity scores as well as distinctiveness scores
was computed. The three statistics of the imposter dissimilarity
scores derived from skilled forgery samples were: 1) the minimum
imposter score (derived from the closest forgery sample), 2) the
average of the three lowest imposter scores, and 3) the average of all
imposter scores. The results obtained for MCYT and SUSIG dataset
are summarized in Table 2. Note that, for each signature in MCYT
dataset, five forgers were chosen at random where each forger pro-
vided five imitation samples. And in SUSIG dataset, there were two
types of forgeries. One was the so-called "skilled forgery" where
one forger is chosen at random to provide five imitation samples for
each signature after watching animation of a targeted signature on a
monitor. The other was the so-called "highly skilled forgery" where
two forgers (the authors of [15]) performed imitation attacks for all
signatures with the knowledge of signature dynamic mapped on the
screen to be traced over.
It is seen that, in cases where forgers are chosen at random, the
correlation coefficient between the golden rank and the proposed
complexity measure is always stronger than the ones between the
golden rank and the proposed distinctiveness measure. However,
in SUSIG dataset, where two forgers imitated all forgery samples
(highly-skilled forgery), one can observe a much weaker correlation
coefficient between the golden rank and the proposed complexity
measure when DTW algorithm is applied. The difference between
skilled and highly-skilled forgeries in SUSIG dataset is the expertise
of the forgers and the content revealed to forgers. That is, for
skilled forgery, the forgers were chosen at random and the content
revealed was the animated signature on the display. And the highly-
skilled forgeries were done by the two authors of the paper and
the content revealed was the animated signatures on the display as
well as on the screen for the forgers to trace over. This knowledge
of signature structure and dynamics mapped on the screen in the
highly-skilled forgery model provides an advantage to attackers in
view of DTW recognition algorithm. Nevertheless, the correlation
coefficient between the golden rank and the proposed complexity
measure remains stronger than that of the distinctiveness measure
when the histogram based approach is applied where the dynamic
content of signature samples is partially destroyed while computing
features.
The above results imply that analyzing the FAR of online signature
templates against imitation forgery by random forgers is differ-
ent from analyzing the FAR of online signature templates against
random forgery. In addition, it confirms the effectiveness of the
proposed complexity measure in indicating FAR against imitation
forgery (the so-called skilled forgery) particularly for random forg-
ers. However, future study to investigate performance of the pro-
posed complexity performance against proficient forgers is still
needed.
4.4 Performance of the repeatability measure
4.4.1 Experimental protocol and Verification algorithm
Since the genuine samples of MCYT and SUSIG dataset were only
collected in one or two separate sessions, these two datasets are not
used in this experiment. Therefore, NYU online signature dataset
and CMU keystroke dynamics dataset [16] are the two datasets used
to evaluate effectiveness of the repeatability metric.
For NYU datatset, the first ten samples were used to derive a user-
specific online signature template and the next five were used to
compute repeatability score for each user. Then, the rest fifteen
ones were used to compute FRR. The verification algorithm used
in this dataset is the histogram approach described in [30]. Re-
peatability score here is computed from dissimilarity scores derived
from the histogram approach. Specifically, the dissimilarity score
is computed as the manhattan distance between the quantized tem-
plate F ′template, or the quantized mean feature vector of the enrolled
samples, and the quantized feature vector of a test signature F ′test .
That is, score = ||F ′template −F ′test || = ∑ni=1 | f ′template(i)− f ′test(i)|
where n is the number of features and F ′ = FQ . And the quantization
vector Q is computed from standard deviation of feature vector F
derived from the enrolled samples. For CMU keystroke dynamics
dataset, there were 400 genuine samples per user were collected
from 8 sessions. The first 200 are used to train a user specific clas-
sification model using an Euclidean distance approach. The last
200 samples were divided into two parts consisting of 50 samples
and 150 samples. The first 50 samples were used to compute re-
peatability score for each user. The second part was then used to
compute FRR for each user. The algorithm used in this dataset is
the feature based approach using 31 timing features, as described
in [16]. The repeatability score here is computed from dissimilarity
scores derived from this feature based approach. SpeciïnˇA˛cally,
the dissimilarity score is the squared Euclidean distance between
the template Ftemplate, or the mean feature vector of the enrolled
samples, and the feature vector of a test signature Ftest . That
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Figure 8: Trade-off curves between FAR of skilled forgery of three algorithms on MCYT and SUSIG dataset versus threshold for each user group separated by
the proposed complexity
Table 2: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between different statistics and complexity scores (denoted as Com.) as well as distinctiveness scores (denoted
as Dis.) of user’s signature templates derived from MCYT and SUSIG dataset
MCYT
Statistics HMM DTW Histogram
Com. Dis. Com. Dis. Com. Dis.
The lowest score 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.11 0 30 0.09
Mean of 5 lowest ones 0.24 0.08 0.30 0.12 0.30 0.13
Mean of all scores 0.23 0.06 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.17
SUSIG
Statistics DTW Histogram
Highly Skilled Skilled Highly Skilled Skilled
Com. Dis. Com. Dis. Com. Dis. Com. Dis.
The lowest score 0.01 0.12 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.15
Mean of 5 lowest ones 0.03 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.11
Mean of all scores 0.01 0.12 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.15
(a) NYU (b) CMU keystroke
Figure 9: Trade-off curves between FRR versus decision threshold for each user group separated by the proposed template repeatability
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Table 3: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between different set of
statistics and repeatability scores of user’s signature templates
Statistics Test dataset
NYU Keystroke
The highest score 0.62 0.89
Mean of 5 highest scores 0.49 0.73
Mean of all scores 0.55 0.80
is, score = ||(Ftemplate − Ftest)||2 = ∑ni=1( ftemplate(i)− ftest(i))2,
where n is the number of features.
4.4.2 Experimental results
For NYU dataset, all signature templates were divided into four
groups according to their repeatability scores. For each of the four
groups, the average FRR of the users within the same group were
computed at different threshold levels. The dependency between
FRR and their repeatability metric is demonstrated in Figure 9(a).
That is, at the same decision threshold, the corresponding FRR of
user groups with higher repeatability is lower than that of users
groups with lower repeatability. Note that, the inverse of repeata-
bility index proposed in subsection 3.3 is only applicable when
signatures are collected from different sessions: enrollment, valida-
tion, and test. Therefore, for online signatures, only NYU dataset
was used to perform this experiment.
For "CMU Keystroke Dynamics - Benchmark Data Set", the depen-
dency result is presented in Figure 9(b). It aligns with the experiment
performed on NYU dataset and confirms the efficacy of the pro-
posed repeatability measure. Note that the users in this dataset are
separated into just two groups since there are only 51 users in total.
To provide a performance analysis of the repeatability measure, the
Spearman Rank correlation was computed between the templates
and their repeatability measure and the following three statistics of
genuine dissimilarity scores derived from skilled forgery samples:
1) the maximum genuine score (derived from the worst genuine test
sample), 2) the average of the five highest genuine scores, and 3)
the average of all genuine scores. The Spearman Rank correlation
between the golden rank computed from these three statistics and
template repeatability scores are summarized in Table 3. The strong
correlation between the template repeatability measure and the three
statistics used demonstrate that the proposed repeatability scores
which are simply derived from the mean dissimilarity scores of
genuine samples from the validation set can be used to indicate FRR
of the templates effectively.
4.5 Application
In this subsection, an application of the three template characteristics
namely distinctiveness, complexity and repeatability to detect prob-
lematic templates is demonstrated on SUSIG dataset. In addition,
the application of distinctiveness and repeatability is demonstrated
on NYU dataset, as in this dataset, skilled forgery samples were not
available. The histogram approach was used for all experiments in
this section as it provided the best verification performance. Also,
the templates used were derived from all the samples in the first ses-
sion (10 samples in SUSIG dataset and 5 samples in NYU dataset).
Repeatability scores were computed from the first five samples in
the subsequent session. Then, the rest of the samples were used as
the genuine test samples. The verification performance in terms of
FAR against random forgery (denoted as FAR-RF), FAR against
imitation forgery or so-called skilled forgery (denoted as FAR-SF),
and FRR when discarding 10% of the templates with the lowest
distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability scores are presented in
Table 4. Note that, SUSIG dataset is collected with supervision to
ensure the quality of the provided signature samples. Nevertheless,
the performance distinction between problematic templates (the
ones with low distinctiveness, complexity and repeatability) and the
rest in the dataset exists. The results show that the proposed three
template characteristics can be used to detect problematic templates
in order to enhance overall verification performance of the system.
Specifically, by discarding the 9 templates (10% of all the templates
in this dataset) with the lowest distinctiveness scores, the average
FAR against random forgery improves from 3.05% to 2.73%, where
the average FAR of the discarded templates is 6.05%. Similarly,
by discarding 10% of templates with the lowest complexity scores,
the average FAR against imitation forgery at the same decision
threshold improves from 6.17% to 5.53%, where the average FAR
of the discarded templates is 12.22%. Also, by discarding 10%
of templates with the lowest complexity scores, the average FAR
against imitation forgery at the same decision threshold improves
from 2.98% to 0.94%, where the average FAR of those discarded
templates is 22.22%.
Note that in this dataset, the samples that are used to compute re-
peatability scores and the ones that are used as genuine test samples
are from the same session as the data set only had two sessions.
Nevertheless, as was seen in the previous section, the strong cor-
relation between repeatability scores and FRR was observed even
when genuine test samples are not from the same session but from
the subsequent session.
Finally, when only considering templates with neither distinctive-
ness, or complexity or repeatability scores in the lowest 10%, HTER
(Half Total Error Rate, or the average rate between FAR and FRR)
of the system decreases from 3.01% to 2.03 (32.5% improvement)
when using the EER decision threshold against random forgery
when all templates are included. Similarly, the HTER of the system,
at the same decision threshold, against imitation forgery decreases
from 4.57% to 3.21 (29.73% improvement). In addition, the ROC
comparison of good and bad templates (the templates are good
when their distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability are not in
the lowest 10%; they are bad otherwise) is depicted in Figure 10. For
random forgery, the verification performance of the bad templates,
is at 6.27% EER as compared to 1.67% EER for the good ones. For
skilled forgery, the verification performance of the bad templates, is
at 8.54% EER as compared to 3.21% EER for the good ones.
Similarly, for NYU dataset, by discarding 18 templates (10% of all
the templates in this dataset) with the lowest distinctiveness scores,
the average FAR against random forgery improves from 7.51%
to 6.57%, where the average FAR of the discarded templates is
15.85%. Similarly, by discarding 10% of templates with the lowest
repeatability score, the average FRR improves from 7.42% to 4.21%,
where the average FAR of the discarded templates is 36.01%. It is
observed that the discrepancy between the templates with the lowest
distinctiveness and repeatability in this dataset is much higher than
of those in SUSIG dataset. This could be due to the fact that, the
samples in this dataset are collected without supervision, unlike
SUSIG dataset. This underscores the need of the performance
measures presented in this paper for mobile, unsupervised settings.
Finally, when discarding templates with either their distinctiveness
or repeatability scores in the 10% lowest score, HTER improves
from 7.47% to 5.80% (22.37% improvement). In addition, ROC
curve comparison of good and bad templates is also depicted in
Figure 10 where EER of the good templates is 5.62% as compared
to 13.87% for the bad ones.
These results demonstrate that the verification performance of the
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Figure 10: ROC curves of good and bad templates in SUSIG and NYU dataset.
Table 4: Verification performance of the system at EER decision threshold
derived from SUSIG dataset and NYU dataset when the 10% of templates
with the lowest distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability scores are
discarded
SUSIG
Constraints ] templates FAR-RF FAR-SF FRR
None 94 3.05 6.17 2.98
Distinctiveness 85 2.73 – 3.06
Complexity 85 – 5.53 3.06
Repeatability 85 3.17 5.88 0.94
All combined 70 2.93 5.29 1.14
NYU
Constraints ] templates FAR-RF FRR
None 178 7.51 7.42
Distinctiveness 160 6.57 8.13
Repeatability 160 7.99 4.21
All combined 142 6.99 4.60
system against random forgery and skilled forgery could be im-
proved simultaneously by enrolling only templates with sufficient
distinctiveness, complexity, and repeatability score. More impor-
tantly, weak user’s templates, in terms of these three measures could
be identified in advance without leaving security and accessibility
of those users in jeopardy.
The three metrics proposed in this paper could also be used to im-
plement other strategies that may be more appropriate for a given
application or for a specific user. For example, given a low dis-
tinctiveness template, the system could verify whether a few bad
enrolled samples could be safely removed to enhance FAR without
degrading FRR. And given a low repeatability template, the system
may prompt users to practice more on their signatures. Exploring
the benefits of the proposed metrics in different ways and in different
applications could be a fertile area for future work.
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper presents three measures, namely distinctiveness, com-
plexity, and repeatability, for online signature templates. These are
three important aspects for a biometric system that operates in an
unsupervised setting not only because the issues are more likely to
occur but when they occur they must be detected automatically. The
measures are based on general statistics and can be derived from
any feature-based biometric template with fixed length feature vec-
tors and hence they can also be applied to other types of biometric
recognition systems.
The proposed distinctiveness measure simultaneously incorporates
the intrinsic difference as well as the consistency of a set of enrolled
samples. The results evaluated on three datasets confirmed the effi-
cacy of the proposed metric in distinguishing between high and low
false acceptance rate templates at the same decision threshold. More-
over, Spearman Rank correlation coefficient of the distinctiveness
score computed from different assumptions about random signa-
tures demonstrated the effectiveness of the statistical assumption
about random signatures as compared to alternate assumptions. In
addition, the characteristics of online signature template in terms of
complexity and repeatability metric were investigated. Experiments
confirmed that the complexity and repeatability of templates can be
inferred from an enrollment set and a validation set that is collected
in sessions other than the training set, respectively. Subsequently,
performance improvements of the system when these three proposed
metrics are simultaneously used to detect problematic templates was
demonstrated.
One area of future work could be to examine other applications and
training strategies to incorporate these three measures to enhance
security, usability, and reliability of an online signature verifica-
tion. In addition, these three metrics could be used to investigate
characteristic differences between datasets of online signatures, and
other biometric modalities, that are collected in unsupervised and
supervised manner. Finally, while the performance of the proposed
template characteristic assessment has been demonstrated on online
signatures and keystroke dynamics, the applicability and effective-
ness of these three metrics towards other biometric modalities has
to be explored.
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